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Comment: More in Defense of U.C.C. Methodology
Robert A. Hillman*
As James Bowers notes in his interesting and insightful contribution
to this symposium,' the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C." or "Code")
methodology has recently come under attack on many fronts.2 For
example, Robert Scott, in a thoughtful and provocative series of articles,
challenges the strategy of attempting to achieve substantive uniformity by
codifying commercial law, particularly in the manner prescribed by Karl
Llewellyn for Article 2 on sales.3 Another line of criticism questions
whether certain contextual aids, such as trade custom, actually exist.4 A
third source of complaints focuses on the negative incentives on the parties
created by specific contextual sources of interpretation. For example, a
prominent claim is that Article 2's reliance on the parties' course of
performance makes the parties more rigid and inflexible in their dealings.5
Bowers focuses much of his defense of the U.C.C. on rebutting Scott's
plain-meaning rule orientation. In Part I of this comment, I briefly
summarize each writers' position and then add a few of thoughts of my
own. In Part I, I respond to the claim that the Code's invocation of course
of performance evidence creates perverse incentives.6
I. SCOTT AND BOWERS
Although U.C.C. Article 2 is "formally uniform," having been
adopted in at least substantial part in all fifty states,7 Scott asserts that,
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1. James W. Bowers, Incomplete Law: On the Inevitable Inadequacies of
Codes, Civil and Commercial, 62 La. L. Rev. 1229 (2002) [hereinafter "Bowers"].
2. On "true Code methodology," see William Hawkland, Uniform
Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. I11. L. F. 291, 292-99.
3. I focus here on Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law,
in The Jurisprudential Foundations of Corporate and Commercial Law 149 (Jody
S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt, eds. 2000) [hereinafter "Scott"].
4. Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's
Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 710, 713 (1999).
5. Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial
Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 781, 784 (1999) [hereinafter "Ben-Shahar"]. See also Eric
A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1697, 1724
(1996).
6. For a critique of the "nonexistence" thesis, see Jody S. Kraus & Steven D.
Walt, In Defense of the Incorporation Strategy, in The Jurisprudential Foundations
of Corporate and Commercial Law 200-07 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt, eds.
2000) [hereinafter "Kraus & Walt"].
7. Editor's Note: Louisiana has not adopted the uniform version of the U.C.C.
Article 2 in whole, but has revised the Louisiana Civil Code law of Sales to parallel
4LoUISIANA LA W REVIEW
because of its methodology, the U.C.C. is "substantively" non-
uniform, meaning that decisions applying it are inconsistent over time
and in different jurisdictions.' The problem, according to Scott, is
that the U.C.C.'s "incorporation strategy" of directing courts to
incorporate contextual evidence when they interpret and fill gaps in
contracts produces inconsistent, non-uniform judicial decisions, and
decreases the supply of reliable standardized gap-filling terms. 0 In
contrast, Scott claims that the common law's "plain meaning" rule,
which resists "the implications of contextualization" and "invoke[s]
the primacy" of express terms," has been more successful in
achieving "a fairly uniform menu of standardized terms ... and a
stable (i.e., uniform) interpretation of express terms." 2
Scott relies on empirical, albeit derived from "casual
observation,"' 3 proof of the superiority of the "plain meaning"
approach in achieving uniform results. Scott asserts that reported
cases show that "the risk of unpredictable interpretation has greatly
increased for commercial parties under the Code."' 4 Although Scott
acknowledges that the Code includes several admonitions to disregard
extrinsic evidence that contradicts the written contract, 5 he argues
that "courts have frequently abandoned this principle on the grounds
that there is almost always some contextual argument upon which
seemingly inconsistent terms can be rationalized.' 6 Moreover, Scott
maintains that parties who wish to protect their written contract terms
from contextual attacks have a "considerable additional burden."' 7
According to Scott, not only is contract interpretation
unpredictable, Article 2's contextual approach also "undermines the
ability of courts to increase the supply" of standard, express gap-
filling terms.'8 This is because "[t]he abandonment by the Code of
the plain-meaning rule has resulted in decisions that strip terms of
their meanings and thus erode the reliability of standardized express
terms."' 9 For example, suppose a court holds that evidence that a
buyer has repeatedly paid for unloading and storage of goods
U.C.C. Article 2. See James W. Bowers, Incomplete Law, supra note 1, at 1231
n.12 and n.13.
8. Scott, supra note 3, at 153.
9. Id. at 164.
10. Id. at 165.
11. Id. at 167.
12. Id. at 150-51.




17. Id. at 165.
18. Id.
19. Scott, supra note 3, at 165.
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overrides an express standardized term (F.A.S.) that allocates
unloading and storage expenses to the seller. Scott asserts that such
a decision undermines the reliability of the F.A.S. term and creates
disincentives for parties to use the term in future contracts.20
Scott mentions several reasons for judicial confusion in applying
the U.C.C.'s "incorporation strategy." He doubts that courts are
equipped to incorporate a commercial subgroup's practices and
experiences in an efficient manner.2' In addition, courts fail because
of "the fact-specific nature" of commercial disputes, which
discourages generalization.22 Moreover, Scott believes that Article
2's solution to the fact-specificity hurdle, namely the invocation of
the "supereminent norm of commercial reasonableness," also
disappoints because, in applying it, courts do not "incorporate
commercial norms," but instead "make deductive speculations" based
on internal Code policy.23
In contrast to the morass of Code interpretation and gap-filling,
Scott asserts the relative certainty of common law results. Scott
claims that "a strong majority of jurisdictions . . . rigorous[ly]
adhere[] to the plain-meaning rule," and have been "unwilling to
accept the implications of contextualization." 4 Under the plain
meaning approach, according to Scott, parties have the incentive to
choose "clear, standardized" terms.25 As a result, the common law
approach is more likely to generate "a menu of standard form
invocations," written by the parties and approved by the courts.26
Next, Scott contends that under the common law "trade organizations
and other private intermediaries," have supplied contract terms "that
have been subject to remarkably uniform interpretation by state
courts. 27 On the other hand, the code has been much slower in
developing similar standardized options.2 In short, Scott finds
empirical proof that the common law has produced clearer and more
certain understandings of contract terms and superior sources of
filling gaps than has Article 2.
In response to Scott, Bowers argues, not that the Code's
contextual orientation has been successful in achieving uniform
interpretation of terms (except in the sense that courts uniformly
20. Id.
21. Id. at 161.
22. Id. at 166.
23. Id.
24. Scott, supra note 3, at 167.
25. Id. at 162.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 168. Scott does not cite cases.
28. Id. at 168. See also id. at 150 ("Under Article 2, there has been very little
production of standardized default rules and other standard form prototypes.").
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incorporate sources outside of written contracts) or reliable
standardized express provisions, but that the Code's methodology
is nonetheless inevitable and desirable if Article 2's goal is to
enforce as closely as possible the parties' intentions.29 Bowers finds
Scott's "plain meaning" orientation unpersuasive" and relies on
legal realism's insights, including that legal decisions are a
function of the "values taken on" by the facts of the case,3' that no
two cases are factually alike,3 2 that words are meaningless out of
context33 or devoid of evidence of their purpose,34 and that, by virtue
of their nature as commitments projected onto an uncertain future,
contracts inevitably are incomplete.3 5 More than that, Bowers
emphasizes the costs parties will incur in accommodating to
dictionary definitions. Specifically, he argues that parties "are
likely to be frequently trapped with inaccurate dictionary definitions
of words which they efficiently use in all the rest of their dealings
in a lexicographically deviant sense."36
Because of Bowers' focus on legal realism, however, he mostly
fails to challenge Scott's empirical comparisons of Article 2 and
29. Bowers, supra note 1, at 1234-35, 1239-40.
30. See also Kraus and Walt, supra note 6, at 234 ("[W]e suspect that very few
terms have a precise and unambiguous 'plain meaning.' When meaning seems
clear, it is usually because context makes it so.").
31. Bowers, supra note 1, at 1240.
32. Id. at 1242-43.
33. Id. at 1240-42.
34. Id. at 1273.
35. Id. at 1238-39, 1244.
36. Bowers, supra note 1, at 1239. Scott is well aware of costs associated with
the plain-meaning rule. Under the plain meaning approach, "contracting parties will
be required to incur the costs of developing standard form specifications for the
many customary understandings that might otherwise have been incorporated by
default." Scott, supra note 3, at 162. Scott simply believes the costs of the Code
incorporation strategy is higher.
Bowers' most powerful example of the benefits of a contextual orientation
is in his section on "distributional dissent." Bowers points out that in their
specifications building contractors promise "to provide perfection," but that parties
contracting with respect to such specifications "understand them to be subject to
some trade customs which grant tolerances from perfection." Bowers, supra note
1, at 1272. As Bowers points out, the "plain meaning" approach, taken literally,
precludes consideration of the trade customs. Moreover, it may be too costly for
the parties, ex ante, to define with precision the degree of perfection required.
To illustrate to my class the importance of context, I often present an
example from the world of sports. Two of my favorite former New York Knicks
players, Walt Frazier and Earl Monroe, began their careers as rivals on different
teams. I remember listening to a radio broadcast in which the announcer said,
"Frazier and Monroe are trading elbows." Because of the context, no one listening
wondered whether my heroes were undergoing limb transplant operations.
[Vol. 621156
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common law.37 With respect to this set of issues, Scott recognizes that
more work needs to be done: "It is clear that more analysis, both
theoretical and empirical, is required before anyone can safely call for
radical reform."38 Scott therefore challenges defenders of the Code to
further investigate his tentative conclusions.
Indeed, consider some of the issues of an empirical nature raised by
Scott's analysis: Do decisions under the Code create a large burden on
parties who seek to protect their written terms? Look at the wording of
the Code. Under section 1-205(1), a course of dealing arises only when
the "sequence of previous conduct ... fairly ...establishe[s] a
common basis of understanding." Under section 1-205(2), a usage of
trade arises only when a practice "justiflies] an expectation that it will
be observed." Under Section 1-205 (4), express terms trump usage of
trade and course of dealing evidence when the evidence is inconsistent
with the express language. Under section 2-208(1), a course of
performance requires "repeated occasions for performance." Under the
same section, the party losing express contract rights must have
"knowledge of the nature of the performance" and an opportunity to
object. Moreover, "knowledge" is defined in section 1-201(25) to
mean "actual knowledge," a subjective test. Finally, section 2-208(2)
provides that express terms prevail over a conflicting course of dealing.
Without a thorough analysis of a large group of cases, why should we
believe that courts are systematically ignoring or misapplying these
clear and direct commands?39 Not only is the language clear enough to
predict judicial compliance, I suggest in the second part of this
comment that there is good reason to believe, at least with respect to
incorporation of evidence from course of performance,4' that courts
generally follow the Code admonitions and allow such evidence to
modify express terms only when the evidence strongly suggests the
parties intended that result.4
37. "The dream of 'substantive uniformity' which Scott berates the Code for
failing to achieve is a straw man." Bowers, supra note 1, at 1239.
38. Scott, supra note 3, at 175.
39. "[T]here is no reason to believe that Article 2 itself frequently incorporates
informal norms." Kraus & Walt, supra note 6, at 209.
40. Critics of the U.C.C. are not always careful to distinguish among the
various components of the incorporation strategy, as if trade custom, course of
dealing, and course of performance always work in the same fashion to defeat
expectations or to create negative incentives. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar, supra note 5,
at 787 n.26 (referring to both course of dealing and course of performance as "past
practices"). See also id. at 789-90. The issues presented by incorporating one type
of evidence, however, may be very different from the problems presented by
incorporating another. For example, a court may honor a contract term barring
evidence of an existing trade custom, but may strike a term barring evidence of a
subsequent course of performance on the theory that the parties ex post conduct
shows their intention to disregard the written term. See id. at 791.
41. See infra notes 62-68, and accompanying text.
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Are court interpretations of contracts and gap filling under the
Code generally unpredictable so that they "strip [contract] terms of
their meaning?" '4 This certainly did not appear to be the position of
businesses participating in the Article 2 revision process that devoted
lots of time and effort to defending (in business to business
transactions) existing Article 2." Businesses almost uniformly
worried that proposed revisions undermined the relative certainty of
transacting under existing Article 2. Moreover, I am unaware of any
effort by business to overturn the Code's use of trade custom, course
of dealing, and course of performance.
Are case decisions interpreting contracts under the common law
more consistent and, for that matter, is the common law still so
wedded to "plain meaning" jurisprudence?" As to the former
question, Scott's position invites a systematic analysis and
comparison of Article 2 and common law cases. Without more
investigation, Bowers points out that it is not self evident why courts
would be more consistent and accurate if the source of interpretation
is a dictionary rather than a trade manual or practice.45
As to whether the common law follows the plain-meaning rule,
many common-law cases look to the U.C.C. for guidance by
analogy.46 Moreover, the Restatement Second of Contracts has taken
up the U.C.C.'s contextual approach.47 In addition, common law
42. Scott, supra note 3, at 165.
43. From late 1994 until 2000 I attended the Article 2 revision committee
meetings as a consultant for the American Automobile Manufacturers Association
(AAMA) and its successor, the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers. We often
met with most of the other businesses participating in the drafting committee
meetings. A primary business concern throughout (evidenced by their letters to the
drafting committee) was whether the proposed revisions, such as to the statute of
frauds and parol evidence rule, would decrease the reliability of business-to-
business written contracts (in the case of AAMA, for example, with its suppliers of
components). Businesses believed that their written contracts were relatively
insulated from attack under existing Article 2. Obviously, this is not the kind of
empiricism I call for in the text, but I mention these observations because others,
including both Bowers and Scott, also have drawn lessons from the U.C.C. revision
process. See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 1, at 1265-66; Scott, supra note 3, at 179
n.27.
44. Scott, supra note 3, at 162-64.
45. Bowers, supra note 1, at 1238 (referring to this as an "empirical question").
See also id. at 1255 ("formalistic techniques" may be a "source of error."); Kraus
& Walt, supra note 6, at 194 ("[I]n many cases, the commercial norm and 'plain-
meaning' candidates will be somewhat vague and ambiguous.").
46. See, e.g., R & L Acoustics v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 2854 at 18.
47. Scott acknowledges this, but does not believe that courts have followed the
Restatement's lead, at least not with the fervor of Article 2 courts. Scott, supra note
3, at 163-64 ("[T]he tide of expansive incorporation has not swept away the
restrained approach of the common law tradition."). But see, e.g., Eskimo Pie Corp.
1158 [Vol. 62
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waiver rules often create the same kind of issues with respect to the
superiority of written terms as do Code sources of evidence such as
course of performance.48 Although it is probably true that common
law courts, on the basis of the parol evidence and "plain meaning"
rules, generally still preclude evidence of prior negotiations that
contradict a writing,49 I would wager that a rigorous empirical survey
of common law cases would show that, on the whole, courts are quite
receptive to evidence of custom and the parties' course of dealing.
For that matter, the common law parol evidence rule is so riddled
with exceptions that I doubt that it contributes very much at all
towards enhancing the certainty of written contracts."0 Furthermore,
the Code's parol evidence rule would also bar evidence of prior
negotiations in much the same way as common law courts. In
general, my hunch is that the Code and the common law are not as
distinct as Scott believes.
Finally, has the common law, more than the Code, inspired more
"standardized options" generated by private organizations and, if so,
what is the significance of this? As with his other observations, Scott
sets the empirical agenda for those investigating U.C.C.
methodology."2 If the U.C.C. is less successful in breeding
standardized terms, then we must ask whether this should be
attributed to Code methodology, the nature of contracts for the sale
of goods, the nature of the parties, or to something else.
v. Whitelawn Dairies, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 987, 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (summarizing
pre-Code "objective" interpretation rules in New York and stating, "the meaning to
be attributed to the language ... is that which a reasonably intelligent person
acquainted with general usage, custom and the surrounding circumstances would
attribute to it.").
48. See, e.g., E. A. Farnsworth, Contracts 540-42 (3d ed. 1999).
49. Id. at 478-80.
50. See, e.g., Hield v. Thyberg, 347 N.W.2d 503,507 (S.Ct. Minn. 1984) ("The
sometimes harsh effect of [the parol evidence] rule is ... ameliorated by a host of
exceptions."); R. Summers & R. Hillman, Contract and Related Obligation 663 (4th
ed. 2001).
51. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (2002).
52. Scott's evidence that the U.C.C. has been unsuccessful in producing
standardized terms is limited. He notes that the National Grain and Feed
Association has "opt[ed] out of the Code entirely." Id. at 168. However, as Kraus
and Walt point out "the superiority of the NGFA for NGFA members has no
bearing on the merits of Article 2's incorporation strategy.... The ability of NGFA
:members to opt out of the Code's regime in part vindicates, rather refutes, the
design of Article 2 by demonstrating the efficacy of its opt-out provisions." Kraus
& Walt, supra note 6, at 216.
To the extent that the Code turns out to be less predictable than common
ilaw, an argument can be made that parties engaged in a U.C.C. transaction might
want to draft even clearer terms to try to escape the imbroglio of the Code, just as
parties seek to settle disputes to avoid the uncertainties ofjury verdicts. See, e.g.,
Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 465, 476.
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Resolution of all of these questions and more53 awaits additional
empirical research, including field studies and case analysis. Until
this work is done, we must defer reaching a definitive conclusion on
which approach, plain meaning or incorporation, is superior.
II. INCENTIVES CREATED BY ALLOWING EVIDENCE OF COURSE OF
PERFORMANCE
I want to devote my last few pages to the criticism that the
Code's incorporation methodology creates negative incentives.
Specifically, I shall look at the incentives created by incorporating
evidence of the parties' course of performance in interpreting a
contract.
5 4
Critics claim that this approach makes the parties inflexible and
uncooperative.5 These critics reason that acting flexibly costs
parties the right, in the future, to insist on performance according to
the express contract terms. By accepting a late performance, for
example, a party loses both the immediate benefits of performance
on time and also the right to insist on timely future performances. 6
A legal order that enforced the written terms regardless of a party's
acquiescence in late performance would have no effect on later
installments. Therefore, to avoid losing rights as to future
performances, parties must be more rigid under Article 2 than under
law that ignores the course of performance. 7
It is very unlikely that the U.C.C.'s incorporation of course of
performance evidence leads to party rigidity. The costs of rigidity
are likely to be high-consider, for example, the costs associated
with the other party's reaction to inflexibility, namely to become
uncooperative, inflexible, and perhaps to look for a new contracting
53. I leave for another day a discussion of the alleged failure of judicial
application of the "supereminent norm of commercial reasonableness." Scott, supra
note 3, at 166.
54. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking
the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765, 1812-
14 (1996) [hereinafter "Bernstein"]; Ben-Shahar, supra note 5, at 782-85.
55. Ben-Shahar, supra note 5, at 784; Bernstein, supra note 54, at 1812-13.
56. "The Code's course of performance provision ... increases the cost of
agreeing to forgiving adjustments. It creates a significant risk that a series of such
adjustments will be found to constitute a course of performance. . . ." Bernstein,
supra note 54, at 1812.
57. Bernstein, supra note 54. In several pages, Ben-Shahar constructs an
interesting model that challenges the rigidity thesis but, after relaxing many of the
assumptions of the model, he ultimately tentatively supports the thesis in part
because he believes the Code increases the need for and costs of monitoring and of
protecting one's rights. Ben-Shahar, supra note 5, at 796-805. I discuss these
concerns in the text that follows.
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partner in the future. Moreover, a low-cost alternative to rigidity
exists for those parties who do not want to lose rights,58 namely
reserving those rights."
Parties who reserve rights may themselves signal a lack of
trust; 60 but certainly reserving rights should cause the other party
less consternation than refusing to deal at all and, therefore, should
cost the party reserving rights less than if that party refused to deal.
Parties who reserve rights also incur the cost of providing notice
and the cost of judicial error in ascertaining their intentions, but
these costs are likely to be low. For example, a party accepting a
late performance can easily reserve her rights to performance on
time in the future-a verbal protest should do.6'
Moreover, little case support appears to exist for the notion that
courts make lots of mistakes in determining whether a party has
reserved rights.62 In fact, the principal case support supplied by
proponents of the rigidity theory tends to show that courts establish
a course of performance only after repeated and clear performances,
just as the U.C.C. directs.63 Professor Ben-Shahar, the author of a
leading piece on the rigidity theory, asserts that course of performance
evidence "will often be allowed to vary and trump the express
terms,"' as if contract terms were somehow generally at risk.6? But
most of Ben-Shahar's case support involves a party's repeated
performances inconsistent with the written terms, without protest,
58. Many parties may be willing to lose rights because they will recover their
costs and then some when the other party cooperates in the future.
59. "[T]he cost ofverbal objections-may often be trivial." Ben-Shahar, supra
note 5, at 808. Under U.C.C. § 2-208(1), the course of performance must be
"accepted or acquiesced in without objection." (emphasis supplied). See supra
notes 37-38, and accompanying text.
60. Ben-Shahar, supra note 5, at 816.
61. See U.C.C. § 2-208(1) (2002) ("any course of performance accepted or
acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the
agreement").
62. "Courts have.., consistently held that rights are waived only when the
breached-against party did not protest the violation." Ben-Shahar, supra note 5, at
808. But see Jason Scott Johnston, Should the Law Ignore Commercial Norms?
A Comment on the Bernstein Conjecture and Its Relevance for Contract Law
Theory and Reform, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1791, 1803 (2001) ("[T]here is much too
high a probability that courts will err in determining what the parties have actually
done or said in their prior dealings."); Bernstein, supra note 54, at 1813 (it will be
"difficult" for parties to "negate the influence" of their conduct on how courts
interpret contracts).
63. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
64. Ben-Shahar, supra note 5, at 787 (emphasis supplied).
65. See also Bernstein, supra note 54, at 1813 ("In practice... it is difficult for
transactors to completely and reliably negate the influence of actions and
adjustments on the interpretive process.").
2002] 1161
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from the other party. In Margolin v. Franklin,66 for example, an
automobile seller agreed to and accepted installment payments at least
eight days late for seven months, without protest, then repossessed the
car the next month after the purchasers failed to pay for eight days
after the contract time for performance.67 In Oregon Bank v. Nautilus
Crane & Equipment Corporation,6s despite a warranty disclaimer in
the contract, the seller authorized repairs and assured the buyer that
its account would be credited for the cost of repairs. The parties met
three times per week, on average, for over a year without the seller
asserting the warranty disclaimer. Even with these facts, the court did
not decide the disclaimer was unenforceable, it merely denied
summary judgment for the seller. The evidence supplied by both of
these cases is persuasive in demonstrating that the party forfeiting
contract rights intended to agree to new terms or, at least, had lulled
the other party into reasonably believing that intention.69
Does the Code increase the costs of monitoring to alert a party to
the prospect of losing rights through a course of performance? If
courts establish a course of performance only after "repeated
occasions for performance" and if the party seeking to enforce the
written contract loses rights only if she has "actual knowledge of the
nature of the performance and an opportunity to object,"7 the Code
incorporation approach should not create incentives to invest too
heavily in monitoring. In short, a party would be charged with a
course of performance only when she knew about the other party's
deviant performance and failed to reserve rights. Accordingly, there
is little need to monitor closely to avoid losing rights. In fact, perhaps
parties would have an incentive not to monitor in order to avoid
gaining "actual" knowledge of a deviant performance.7
The overall costs of Code incorporation of course of performance
evidence should therefore be low. Let us compare the results in a
regime that ignored course of performance in favor of the plain
66. 270N.E.2d 140 (1971).
67. Although the seller claimed to have sent "reminder notices," the court
accepted one of the purchaser's testimony that the seller sent only one notice and
then told the purchaser the notice was sent by mistake. Id. at 142. The court found
that "the testimony and exhibits indicate a pattern of conduct on the part of [the
seller] to accept payments from the [purchasers] on or before the 27th day of each
month." Id.
68. 683 P.2d 95 (1984).
69. Ben-Shahar discusses only a few additional cases, but still asserts that
course of performance has trumped express language "in a long line of cases" and
"in a wide variety of circumstances." Ben Shahar, supra note 5, at 790.
70. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
71. There may be other reasons for monitoring, of course. In addition, if a
party intentionally avoided monitoring perhaps a court would charge that party with
the knowledge she should have had.
[Vol. 621162
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meaning of a contract. Parties would not have to reserve rights and
incur the minor costs of doing so. However, to make legally
enforceable alterations of their arrangement they would have to bear
the costs of entering a formal modification agreement. Such costs
might be significant. For example, consider the costs of planning and
drafting a new express contract each time the parties sought to alter
the time for performance by a few days. If the parties dispense with
a written contract modification in situations that do not require a
writing, consider the costs of judicial error concerning the parties'
intentions, which, in this instance, may be significant. Without a
writing or evidence of consideration, which is not necessary to
modify a sales contract but which is a primary source of evidence of
an intention to contract, courts may be prone to make mistakes
determining whether the parties intended to enter an enforceable
modification agreement.7"
Finally, suppose for the sake of argument that the costs and
benefits to the parties of incorporating course of performance
evidence outlined above (the Code approach) were about equal to the
costs and benefits to the parties of barring the evidence (the "plain
meaning" strategy). To save transaction costs, the default rule should
then depend on whether more parties are likely to want to make
legally enforceable adjustments to their contracts or more parties want
to preserve their initial contract rights, even if, as a matter of comity,
they may accede to a defective performance.73 As with the issues
raised in Part I of this comment, the answer to this empirical question
is not clear.74 Some writers are beginning to produce impressive
empirical research on related questions, focusing on particular
industries75 and perhaps someday we will have a definitive answer.
In the meantime, the literature on relational contract offers a clue.
The thrust of that school is that parties often voluntarily accede to a
defective performance, in part because they believe that people
72. Modification agreements do not require a writing, except when the Statute
of Frauds applies, itself a complex and confusing doctrine, nor do modification
agreements require consideration to support them. See U.C.C. § 2-209(1) and (3)
(2002).
73. See Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and
Employment At Will, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 8, 52 (1993). Other default-rule approaches
are possible. For example, the law could assign the default rule based on
minimizing the cost of bargaining away from that rule. See id. Under this test,
bargaining away from the complex Code approach to the simplicity of plain
meaning should be cheaper than the other way around. Id. at 53.
74. "Some commercial practices are indicative of'formal' norms, which parties
intend to be given legal effect, while others indicate 'informal' norms, which parties
intend not to be given effect." Kraus & Walt, supra note 6, at 207.
75. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 54.
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should be flexible and cooperate76 and in part because they believe
that the benefits of being flexible (which include future
accommodations of their own needs by the other party) outweigh the
costs." The norms arising from such ongoing relations do not
suggest that parties intend to reserve the legal right to fall back on
previous terms.78 If a majority of Article 2 cases are relational, the
Code therefore may supply the correct default rule even if the costs
and benefits to the parties of law with and without course of
performance are otherwise about equal.
CONCLUSION
Code critics have done an admirable job of raising important
issues and focusing the debate on critical aspects of U.C.C.
methodology. If the critics are correct, then the Code has been a
colossal failure. James Bowers argues, however, that Code
methodology ameliorates the problem of incompleteness and, hence,
unpredictability in judicial interpretation. In this comment, I have
sought to aid Bowers in manning the barricades in defense of Article
2 by calling for more empirical research before anyone reaches a final
conclusion on the U.C.C.'s effectiveness.
76. See Robert A. Hillman, The Limits ofBehavioral Decision Theory in Legal
Analysis: The Case ofLiquidated Damages, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 717,724-25 (2000).
77. Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment ofLong- Term Contracts: An Analysis
Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 Duke L. J. 1, 5-6. See also Victor P. Goldberg,
Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 527, 532.
78. See Kraus & Walt, supra note 6, at 210 ("Our speculation is that observable
patterns of commercial behavior more often than not reflect formal [which the
parties intend to be enforceable] rather than informal norms [which the parties do
not intend to be enforceable].").
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